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Poverty and Electoral Power
RICHARD A. CLOWARD

Columbia University School of Social Work
and
FRANCES Fox PIVEN

City University of New York
Graduate School and University Center

The poverty of the American underclass cannot be overcome
by any single strategy. But surely it will not be reduced without
new government interventions in education, training, employment, housing, and social welfae. That raises the question of
how the electoral power-especially electoral power exercised
by the underclass itself-can be mobilized to win new public
policies.
Only about half of Americans will go to the polls in November 1988, compared with turnout levels between 75% and 95%
in other western democracies. Since it is the poorly-educated
who vote least, Americans generally attribute low voting to
inadequate civic or political education. But why then do the
less-educated vote almost as much as the better-educated in
other major democracies?
High turnout is encouraged in other countries because citizens are placed on registration lists automatically when they
come of age, or they are registered periodically by governmentsponsored door-to-door canvasses. In the United States, by
contrast, it is up to each citizen to figure out how and where
to register, and that may not be an easy matter, especially for
poorer and minority people. As a result, only 61% of those
eligible are registered; upwards of 70 million are not, and 2 out
of 3 of them are below the median income. (Elections officials
claim that 75% are registered, but they base this figure on local
lists which are clogged with the names of millions of people
who have died, or who are counted twice because they moved
and reregistered elsewhere.)

Furthermore, the US Census Bureau reports that people
"overwhelmingly go to the polls" once they are registered. In
1984, 88% of registrants voted, including 78% of those with
eighth grade education or less.
It is also worth remembering that Americans had the highest rate of voting in the world in the 19th century, despite low
education levels. But that was before politicians created voter
registration requirements. Turnout plummeted at the beginning of the 20th century, when poll taxes, literacy tests, and
longterm residency requirements were introduced. At the
same time, voter registration offices were opened in county
seats where citizens had to prove that they met these qualifications to officials who were often intimidating and hostile.
With blacks and most poor whites disenfranchised in the
South, southern presidential turnout fell from an average of
67% in the latter half of the 19th century to a low of 19% in
1924 (and it did not rise appreciably until the post-World War
II struggle for voting rights). Literacy tests and obstructive registration procedures also reduced northern presidential turnout
from an average of 83% in the elections of the late 19th century
to 55% in the early 1920s. Indeed, fourteen northern states
were using literacy tests as late as 1970, when they were outlawed by amendments to the Voting rights Act.
A good many commentators claim that registration procedures are more liberal than ever before. True, poll taxes and
literacy tests are gone. But outside of the South, the main
reform in registration procedures consists of allowing people
to register by mail. This reform is more apparent than real
because provision is rarely made for the wide distribution of
the postcard forms so that people can get ready access to them.
States with mail-in systems do not have higher registration
levels because people may still have to travel to a county seat,
or to a downtown office in a central city simply to register.
Not only has voter registration not been liberalized to the
extent claimed by many commentators, but the political parties
are less likely than in the past to provide "hands on" assistance
with registration procedures. National political campaigns run
as media events do not put voter registration cards in people
hands. The local party infrastructure created during the new

Deal to help people hurdle registration barriers has decayed.
For example, the shrinking industrial unions are no longer
capable of reaching many unregistered workers, especially the
low-wage nonunionized workers in the vast and growing service sector. Many of the traditional big-city parties persist more
to organize graft than to organize voters, or they refuse to
mobilize potential black and Hispanic voters for fear of fueling
racial challenges. In other words, without local organizations
to help people sign up, registration barriers become more telling, gradually driving turnout down.
What continues to be astonishing about the United States,
in short, is the resistance to making it convenient to register to
vote. Many politicians argue that registering shouldn't be easy,
that people ought to earn the privilege. But the voter registration system is supposed to be a method of listing eligible voters,
not of weeding out those whom politicians consider undeserving. In effect, restrictions on times and places for voter registration are the functional equivalents of earlier property and
literacy qualifications.
Registration barriers are not the only reason that turnout is
low, nor were they the only reason that turnout fell in the first
place. With voting by the have-nots restricted in the early 20th
century, party organizers turned away from the candidates,
the policies, and the campaign language that would attract
them. This marked a major difference with the course of political development in other industrial democracies where labor
parties emerged which articulated the interests of workingclass people, and mobilized them to vote. The tendency of
poorer and minority people to abstain from voting in the
United States because of registration restrictions has thus been
reinforced by their marginalization from the political culture.
This may explain much about the relative lack off class-consciousness among American workers. The labor parties of
Europe were agents of class socialization, but the American parties were not forced to give form and voice to a distinctive class
politics. This was especially true in the South, given the virtually total disenfranchisement of blacks and poor whites.

Even the celebrated New Deal party was not a party of
working people in the same sense as the labor parties of Europe
because it was based on an absurd coalition. Northern industrial workers who favored union rights and social programs
were joined with better-off southern whites who favored rightto-work laws and generally opposed social welfare protections.
Naturally enough, southern Democrats elected to the Congress
readily joined with northern Republicans, and the resulting
conservative alliance dominated post-war policy. The New
Deal party, in short, was divided against itself, and against
working people.
Congress is now holding hearings on the Universal Voter
Registration Act of 1988. Among other things, the bill would
require that all federal agencies, and all federally-assisted state
and local agencies, offer voter registration services to the public, thus making voter registration the single most widely available service offered by government. But the bill's prospects are
not good.
One reason is that business, which finances the parties, is
hardly likely to go along with an increase in have-not voting
at a time when it is pressing Congress to cut the social programs. Party opposition is another reason. Most Republicans
fear that higher voting by poorer and minority people would
benefit the Democrats, even endangering their hold on the
presidency. They prefer the present voter registration system
because they can manipulate it to their advantage with money.
Together with the Christian Right, the Republican Party has
been spending millions of dollars to expand registration among
conservatives and higher income whites. As for the Democrats,
most probably would not favor expenditures for voter registration even if their party had the money to spend. An upsurge
of have-not and minority voting would disrupt the balance of
voter blocs within the Democratic party, eroding support
among some groups and strengthening among other groups
(as Jesse Jackson's campaign suggests).
Finally, incumbency is a major source of opposition, as

Jimmy Carter explained after his voter registration reform bill
went down to defeat in 1977: "The more senior and more influential members of the Congress have very safe districts. To
have a 25 or 30% increase in unpredictable new voters is something they don't relish."
Nevertheless, the Democratic party is not monolithic. A
number of Democrats at the state, county, and city levels
depend on minority votes. Think only of black mayors. And
there is a simple, cheap, and fraud-free way by which they can
act to override traditional barriers to voter registration. They
can permit government employees to ask people who apply
for services whether they would like to register to vote. State,
county and municipal legislatures can create such voter registration programs by enacting legislation; governors, county
executives and mayors can create them by issuing executive
orders.
Sixteen states now have "Motor Voter" programs which
allow people to register to vote in motor vehicle offices; 12
states also now allow people to register in state welfare and
unemployment offices. Some of these programs resulted from
legislation and others from gubernatorial executive orders. Big
city councils and mayors are also acting. Registration services
are now available in municipal agencies in Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Antonio, Houston, Dallas, Austin,
Atlanta, Birmingham, Washington, D.C., and New York.
In other words, the agency-based reform strategy takes
advantage of the oft-noted decentralized and fragmented character of the American state. It is a strategy that can be tailored
to exploit the numerous openings provided by the different
levels of government and by the overlapping powers of the
legislative and executive branches. If registration services cannot be won at one level or by one branch, they might be won
at another level or by the other branch. When state legislatures
balk, for example, then perhaps county or municipal legislatures will act; or perhaps it is governors, county executives, or
mayors who will act. Big city black and Hispanic mayors could,
by themselves, produce millions of new registrants among
poorer and minority people. A mayorality approach is even

feasible in the South where most legislatures and governors
would not want access to registration widened, but where the
growing number of black mayors might.
We should also note that agency-based registration is
resulting from law-suits. As a result of a consent decree negotiated by the NAACP Education and Legal Defense Fund Inc.,
the state of Arkansas is establishing registration services in
agencies throughout the state. And a suit taken by the Southern California chapter of ACLU in Los Angeles, now on appeal
before the highest state court, may result in a judgment
upholding the orders of the lower courts that the county's
20,000 health and welfare workers must offer to register their
clients to vote.
Most of these developments were stimulated by the stateby-state organizing, lobbying, and collaborative litigation
efforts of an organization with which we are associted called
Human SERVE. What makes Human SERVE voter registration
reform successes significant is that it is only a small staff organization with virtually no political resources. The very fact that
it has had so many successes suggests there are indeed politicians at the state and local level who have an incentive to
expand the electorate from the bottom. And if influential
national organizations with stakes invoting rights-such as
civil rights, voter registration, public interest, women, social
welfare, and religious groups-were now to join in bringing
pressure to bear on state and local officials, much larger
advances could be made. The climate of legitimacy is already
favorable: most national bodies of public officials have alredy
endorsed this strategy, including the National Association of
Secretaries of State, and associations of both mayors and cities,
and of both black and Hispanic officials.
Finally, there is a relationship between raising the local registration levels and ultimately winning national reform. If a
massive rise in the local registration rolls were to occur,
congressional Democrats would no longer have much reason
to resist enacting comprehensive national reform-to do so
would merely ratify what had already largely occurred. Given
greatly increased registration levels, the main effect of national
legislation would be to bring recalcitrant states into line, and
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to institutionalize the process of sustaining high levels of voter
registration over time.
Of course, no one can be sure that millions of poorer and
minority nonvoters would go to the polls if registration procedures were reformed, or that they would vote differently
than better-off whites. What is certain is that there is a good
deal of opposition to finding out. Otherwise, national political
leaders would have long since reformed the registration system
in the sure confidence that nothing would change. So there is
some reason to think that mobilizing greater electoral power
at the bottom of our society might result in policies to help
overcome poverty.

